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This paper constructs a quantitative model of intergenerational mobility in which lifetime
income mobility is shaped by various channels including parental time investments in children.
The calibrated model delivers positive educational gradients in parental time investment, as ob-
served in the data, and also successfully accounts for untargeted distributional aspects of income
mobility, captured in the income quintile transition matrix. The model implies that removing
the positive educational gradients in parental time investment during the whole childhood would
reduce intergenerational income persistence nearly by 40 percent. Policy experiments suggest
that subsidies to childhood investments that can diminish positive educational gradients in
parental time investments would increase intergenerational mobility, and that there are better
ways of subsidizing investments to achieve greater mobility in terms of aggregate output and
welfare.
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1 Introduction
A large body of literature has found that intergenerational income mobility is low in the United
States (Solon 1999; Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez 2014a). A growing empirical literature ex-
amining sources of such low mobility, as reviewed in Black and Devereux (2011), suggests that a
key determinant of intergenerational mobility in the US is family background. However, it still
remains to be understood which specific family factors are quantitatively relevant for low mobility
and through what mechanisms such factors shape intergenerational persistence of lifetime income.
The answers to these questions are essential for designing policies to increase intergenerational
mobility. This paper develops a quantitative model of intergenerational mobility in which lifetime
income mobility is shaped by multiple channels and investigates the quantitative effects of various
mechanisms and policy changes on intergenerational mobility. In particular, the focus of this paper
is on the role of parental time investment that has been hardly explored in the literature.
The model economy builds on a standard heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets framework
(Huggett 1993; and Aiyagari 1994) while following the tradition of Becker and Tomes (1986) in that
altruistic parents care about their descendants’ utility. Households are heterogeneous in multiple
dimensions such as human capital, assets, education and age. Young parents, who face additional
state variables for their child such as their human capital and learning ability, choose how much
time and money to invest in their children in addition to standard consumption-savings and labor
supply decisions. Children’s human capital evolves according to the multiple-period production
technology featuring dynamic complementarity and self-productivity, as highlighted by Cunha and
Heckman (2007).1 When children become young adults, they make their own college decision that
affects their future life-cycle wage profiles. Parents can affect this decision indirectly through their
parental investments and inter-vivos transfers to their children, as college decisions are affected by
pre-college human capital and assets. Adult human capital is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which
cannot be fully insured since households have access to the non-state-contingent asset. Households
face not only borrowing limits in each period but also across generations because parents are not
allowed to borrow against their descendants’ income.
1Dynamic complementarity denotes a higher productivity of investments with a higher current stock of human
capital, and self-productivity refers to positive effects of human capital in one period on human capital in the next
period.
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The model economy is calibrated to US data by matching relevant target statistics. In particular,
my calibration strategy requires the model economy to deliver positive educational gradients in
parental time investment that are empirically consistent with those observed in the American Time
Use Survey (ATUS) data (Guryan, Hurst and Kearney 2008; and Ramey and Ramey 2010). An
important contribution of my paper relative to recent work in the literature (e.g., Lee and Seshadri
2019) is to evaluate a candidate model as a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility by
confronting it with the empirical income quintile transition matrix, and to thereby establish its
success in explaining those disaggregated moments.2 Specifically, I find that my model successfully
replicates the quintile income transition matrix in US data, although the calibration targets only
a single intergenerational mobility statistic (i.e., the correlation between the percentile rank of
parents’ income and that of children’s income). In particular, the upward mobility rate — the
probability of children from the parents in the bottom income quintile moving up to the first
income quintile — in the model (7.0%) is strikingly close to 7.5% in US data (Chetty et al. 2014a).
Using the model economy, I conduct counterfactual exercises to investigate the role of vari-
ous mechanisms including the parental time investment channel in shaping the intergenerational
persistence of lifetime income. The model implies that removing heterogeneity in parental time
investments reduces intergenerational mobility quite significantly. Having conducted this exercise
in different stages of childhood, I find that removing educational gradients in parental time in-
vestments in all childhood periods decreases the intergenerational elasticity or rank correlation of
lifetime income nearly by 40% and raises the upward mobility rate by 4 percentage points. It
should be noted that these are equilibrium effects that allow parents to endogenously respond to
use the other existing channels to transmit their economic status intergenerationally. I also exam-
ine the role of the other channels in shaping the intergenerational persistence of lifetime income.
Interestingly, I find that shutting down inter-vivos transfers induces parents to rely more heavily
on childhood human capital production to transmit their economic status, leading to a greater
persistence of lifetime income across generations.
In light of the above findings, I also use my model to characterize the desirable properties of
policy interventions to increase intergenerational mobility. I consider each policy’s implications not
2This exercise is not commonly done in the literature. An early example of the model-generated quartile transition
matrix in Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) shows that this is not a trivial task.
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only for intergenerational mobility estimates, but also for aggregate output and welfare in order
to evaluate whether those policies that do affect the intergenerational persistence of inequality are
otherwise desirable for the overall economy. The first policy experiment I conduct aims to facilitate
access to college by subsidizing college costs. I find that these policies, which do raise a fraction of
college graduates, do not guarantee greater intergenerational mobility due to positive selection into
college. More precisely, those who decide to go to college even before the policy change tend to have
higher pre-college human capital as well as higher returns to college than marginal students do.
Hence, facilitating college access does not substantially alter the relative standing of the marginal
students, thereby having little effects on intergenerational mobility of lifetime income.
Given the quantitatively significant role of the parental time investment channel, it is natural
to consider policies that affect parental time investments directly. However, parental time spent
with children are typically home-based, and are not observable to government. My second set of
policy experiments therefore considers subsidizing monetary investments in children that are com-
plementary inputs to human capital production. I find that it is generally successful in increasing
intergenerational mobility when government increases the size of public education investments di-
rectly. However, as private education spending is crowded out, output and welfare gains are not
sizeable. On the other hand, I find that subsidizing private education spending could raise inter-
generational mobility, accompanied by sizeable gains in output and welfare. I highlight that an
important condition for this success is to subsidize private education in the period when the size
of public investments is relatively small (e.g., early childhood). Specifically, subsidies to private
education may not be able to induce poor parents to invest more time in the presence of sizeable
public investments, and they could even reduce intergenerational mobility.
This paper builds on a growing literature that investigates intergenerational economic persis-
tence in quantitative dynamic equilibrium models with heterogeneous households where the dis-
tribution of income evolves over time endogenously. Following a seminal study by Restuccia and
Urrutia (2004) that presented a model that abstracts from potentially important features such as
capital accumulation, valued leisure, idiosyncratic labor market shocks and multi-stage parental in-
vestments, recent papers increasingly consider models with richer environments (e.g., Holter 2015;
Rauh 2017; Daruich 2019; Lee and Seshadri 2019 among others). The first distinguishing feature
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of my paper is its explicit focus on the parental time investment channel, which has so far received
almost no attention in this literature. Lee and Seshadri (2019) is an exception that also models
parental time investments.3 However, the main counterfactual analysis and policy experiments,
both of which focus on the parental time investment channel, differs from Lee and Seshadri (2019).
Second, my paper is distinguished in this literature as it evaluates the calibrated model through
not only the targeted empirical correlation of income across generations — as is standard in the
literature — but also through the non-targeted US income quintile transition matrix.
In the literature using structural models that abstracts from early childhood development, initial
conditions of adult human capital around early 20’s are found to be crucial to account for lifetime
income inequality (e.g., Keane and Wolpin 1997; Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron 2011). This result
naturally implies that it is essential to look at what happens before early 20’s in order to study
how mobile lifetime income is over generations. Therefore, my model endogenizes various channels
before adulthood to examine how lifetime income persistence is shaped by different forces before
adulthood.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature that uses equilibrium models of human capital
investment across generations to study policies designed to raise human capital of children from
disadvantaged families (e.g., Fernandez and Rogerson 1998; and Caucutt and Lochner 2020). So
far, this literature has mostly focused on parents’ inadequate financial investments in children’s
human capital. In contrast, my paper highlights the role of parental time investments in improving
human capital of children from disadvantaged families.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment. Section 3 explains
how the parameters of the baseline model economy are calibrated and discusses the relationship
between parameters and target statistics in the model. Section 4 evaluates the baseline model econ-
omy as a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility through non-targeted statistics implied
by the model. Section 5 presents the counterfactual exercises to investigate the quantitative role
of various mechanisms on intergenerational mobility, and Section 6 explores a series of policy ex-
periments that illustrates the desirable properties of policies to increase intergenerational mobility.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
3Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) and Zhu and Vural (2013) also present a model with endogenous parental time in
a single childhood period. See also Morchio (2018) and Daruich (2019).
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Table 1: Timeline of life-cycle events
Parent’s age
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
Model age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Key decisions ← −−−−−−−−−−−−− Consumption-savings −−−−−−−−−−−− →
← −−−−−−−−−−− Labor supply −−−−−−−−−− → Retired − →
College ← − Parental − → Inter-
Investments vivos
Child’s model age ← −− Childhood −− → 1 2 3 4 5
2 Model
The model builds on a standard incomplete-markets general equilibrium framework where the
economy consists of heterogeneous households, the representative firm and government.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of a continuum of households. A household is
composed of an adult who lives with a child until the child grows up. One model period corresponds
to five years, and an adult lives for eleven model periods (age 20-74) as an economic decision maker.
In Table 1, I summarize the timeline of life-cycle events for a sample parent for illustration. The
adult agent supplies labor beginning at period j = 1 (age 20) until retirement at the beginning
of j = 10 (age 65). The agent then lives for two periods after retirement and dies at the end of
period j = 11. In all periods, the agent makes a consumption-savings choice. The next generation
is born when the agent enters the period j = 3. Then, the parent invests time and money in their
children in periods j = 3, 4, 5. Before the child becomes independent (j = 5), the parent decides on
inter-vivos transfers. The newly formed household faces the same lifetime structure as described
above.
All households have identical preferences over consumption c and hours worked n, represented








with the disutility constant b > 0.
In each period while working, earnings y are subject to progressive taxation following the
parametric form of Benabou (2002) and Heathcote, Storeletten, and Violante (2014). Specifically,
after-tax earnings for those who earns y is given by
λj (y/ȳ)
−τj y (2)
where τj shapes the degree of progressivity, λj captures the scale of taxation and ȳ denotes the
average earnings. Note that τj and λj are indexed by age to allow the labor taxation to depend on
the family structure, as in US data (e.g., Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2014; Holter, Krueger and
Stepanchuk 2019).
In all periods, capital income is taxed at the rate of τk unless the net worth is non-positive.
Households receive transfers T and face borrowing constraints (Aiyagari 1994). Following Lee and





so that households are always able to pay back their debt in the next period.
This paper considers stationary environments in which market-clearing prices and aggregate
quantities are constant over time. Therefore, the time index for the variables is omitted and a
variable with a prime denotes its value in the next period. I now present the household’s decision
problems starting from period 1.
Period 1: College education A child becomes an independent economic decision maker in the
model age j = 1 (20 years old) with three state variables in addition to j: a human capital stock of
h, a level of asset holdings a, and the childhood learning ability φ. As discussed below, the first two
state variables, h and a, are endogenously determined by their parents. Although the childhood
learning ability is not directly relevant to those who already became an adult, it is still a state
variable because it affects the learning ability of their child who is to be born in period j = 3. An
important decision to be made in period j = 1 is whether to attain college education or not. Given
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the discrete nature of this choice, it is convenient to define the value of not completing college and
the value of completing college separately.
First, the household’s value of not going to college (κ = 1) is given by










′, a′, κ, φ)
}
(4)
subject to c+ a′ ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ P + T
P = (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}
h′ = exp(z′)γ1,κh
κ = 1
where wκ is the rental price of human capital for skill type κ per unit hours of work, r is the
interest rate and P is the initial asset saved and transferred by parents (inter-vivos transfers).
Human capital evolves at the gross growth rate of γj,κ, which depends on age j and education
κ to capture the empirical age-profile of wage for different skilled workers, and is subject to the
idiosyncratic shock (or market luck) z. As in Huggett et al. (2011), I assume that z follows an
i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero and the standard deviation of σz. Note that although z
is drawn from an i.i.d. distribution, its effect persists over the rest of the life because z is not a
shock to earnings but rather a shock to human capital. The idiosyncratic shocks z cannot be fully
insured because a is not a state-contingent asset. As h′ is uncertain due to z′, households take
expectation on the next period value V2.
To define the value of going to college, it is useful to discuss how the college education affects
households in the model. On the one hand, college degree affects the agent’s life-cycle wages in two
ways. First, college education allows them to enter the skilled labor market (i.e., κ = 2), receiving
w2 over the life cycle. Second, college changes the life cycle profile of wages through {γj,κ}
8
j=1 .
On the other hand, college is costly and requires a stochastic fixed cost of ψ(ξ, a), as in the recent
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literature (e.g., see Caucutt and Lochner 2020). Specifically, the college cost is defined as
ψ(ξ, a) = max {exp(ξ)− ι exp(−a), 0} (5)
where ξ is an exogenous source of stochastic fixed costs, following an i.i.d. normal distribution with
the mean of µξ and the standard deviation of σξ. With the degree parameter being positive ι > 0,
the second component is designed to capture needs-based scholarships because exp(−a) is positive
and decreases with a. The max operator makes sure that the college cost stays non-negative.
Then, the value of going to college after the realization of ξ is given by










′, a′, κ, φ)
}
subject to c+ a′ + ψ(ξ, a) ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ P + T (6)
P = (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}
h′ = exp(z′)γ1,κh
κ = 2
where additional elements reflect the benefits and costs of college education, as described above.
Households make a discrete choice regarding college education after observing a draw of ξ. The
expected value at the beginning of j = 1 is then defined as
V1(h, a, φ) = Eξmax {N(h, a, φ), C(h, a, φ, ξ)} . (7)
Period 2: Young adult without children In this period, households face a standard life cycle
problem. That is, households make consumption-savings and labor supply decisions.










′, a′, κ, φ′)
}
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subject to c+ a′ ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ (1 + r)a− τkrmax{a, 0}+ T
h′ = exp(z′)γ2,κh.
The only non-standard element is about taking expectation over the ability of the child to be born
next period (i.e., φ′) because each household is going to be endowed with a child whose ability
is drawn stochastically at the beginning of period j = 3. I assume that it is correlated across
generations, following an AR(1) process in logs
log φ′ = ρφ log φ+ εφ (8)
where εφ ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ). The exogenous source of a positive correlation of human capital across
generations — which is standard in the literature (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia 2004; Herrington
2015; Holter 2015; Rauh 2017; Lee and Seshadri 2019) — may capture not only genetic transmission
but also any residual intergenerational persistence not explained by modelled elements.
Periods 3-5: Parental investments At the beginning of j = 3, a child is born with the learning
ability of φ. The child’s human capital at the end of childhood is affected by parental inputs and
government inputs in periods j = 3, 4, 5, and learning ability. The human capital production
technology captures how these affect the whole process. My modelling approach builds on the
childhood skill formation literature (Cunha and Heckman 2007) in encompassing the features that
skill formation is a multi-stage process and that investments in different periods are complementary.
I first describe how parental inputs and government inputs are aggregated in each period.
Investment inputs are of the forms of time and money. Let Ij denote the total investment inputs












where xj is parental time, ej is private education spending, gj denotes public education investment,
θxj ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative share of time investments in period j.
4 Note that ζj ≤ 1 shapes the
4For notational convenience, the technology is indexed by the parent’s age j, given that there is a one-to-one
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elasticity of substitution between time and money in period j, 11−ζj , and is allowed to be general, as
compared to unit elasticity in Lee and Seshadri (2019). Since time and money have different units,
each input is entered after being normalized by their corresponding unconditional means, which is
useful for calibrating ζj .
5 As is standard in the literature, private and public monetary investments
are assumed to be perfect substitutes (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia 2004; Holter 2015).
Given the aggregated inputs in period j, the developed human capital at the end of period 5,
hc,6, is determined by the technology f




> 0, implying dynamic complementarity (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Caucutt and
Lochner 2020). As in Lee and Seshadri (2019), the technology features unit elasticity of substitution
across periods (Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall 2014) and constant returns to scale. The following










c,j if j = 3, 4 (11)
where θIj ∈ (0, 1).
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I now describe the decision problem of parents, which incorporates the human capital investment
choices described above. I assume that the child shares the household consumption c, according
to the household equivalence scale q, and does not make time allocation decisions relevant to the
relationship between children’s age and the parent’s age in the model.









j=3 (ēj + gj) where x̄j and ēj are the average of x and e in period j,
respectively. As shown by Cantore and Levine (2012), normalization is necessary for the analysis of changing the
elasticity of substitution parameter unless it is fixed at one (Cobb-Douglas).

















































household’s economic status during childhood. The following functional equation summarizes a
parent’s decision problem for j = 3 :










′, a′, κ, h′c, φ)
}
subject to c+ a′ + e ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}+ T












where ϕ > 0 captures the disutility of time investments and (12) is obtained by combining (9) and
(11).7 Note that parents have an incentive to invest their time x and money e in their children
because these investments would lead to greater human capital at the end of childhood according
to the production technology (10). On the other hand, these investments are costly: parental
time reduces utility and private education spending reduces income available for consumption and
savings.
For j = 4, 5, the decision problem is similarly defined as










′, a′, κ, h′c, φ)
}
7Given the exogenous transmission of learning ability, the initial human capital when a child is just born is assumed
to be homogeneous: hc = 1 (see e.g., Herrington, 2015; and Lee and Seshadri, 2019).
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subject to c+ a′ + e ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}+ T

























c if j = 5. (14)
where the state vector additionally includes the child’s human capital at the beginning of the period,
hc. Recall that the state variable κ can take either 1 or 2, depending on the college decision made
in the period j = 1.
Period 6: Inter-vivos transfers At the end of j = 6, the child becomes independent. The
decision problem in this period thus includes a decision for inter-vivos transfers ac, which is trans-
ferred at the beginning of j = 7 to the next generation that forms a new household entering j = 1.
This financial transfer could help their child’s college decision financially. The decision problem is
summarized by





















subject to c+ a′ + a′c ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}+ T
h′ = exp(z′)γ6,κh
h′c = γchc
where the continuation value now includes the initial value function of the child, defined above
in (7), weighted by the degree of altruism η > 0. As is clear in the continuation value term, the
intergenerational link is modeled following the dynastic utility approach in the sense that parents
care about their child’s utility, which in turn depends on the next generation’s utility, and so on.
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This recursive structure linked by altruism combines successive generations as a single dynasty as in
Becker and Tomes (1986). Finally, a′c cannot be negative, meaning that households are not allowed
to borrow from their child’s future income.
Periods 7-11: Without children Once the child becomes an adult, the state variables do not
have to include hc and φ. The decision problems in the remaining periods are standard. Households
make consumption-savings and labor supply decisions in periods j = 7, 8, 9 (age 50-64) until they
retire in j = 10 (age 65). The household’s problem in j = 7, 8, 9 is summarized by












if j = 7, 8, 9 (16)
subject to c+ a′ ≤ λj (wκhn/ȳ)
−τj wκhn+ (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}+ T
h′ = exp(z′)γj,κh.
When households retire (j = 10, 11), they receive social security pension payments Ω.8 The
value in the retirement stages is given by









subject to c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a− τkrmax{a, 0}+ T +Ω
and Vj=12(·) = 0.
8This assumption on the flat pension benefit is quite common (e.g., Abbott et al. 2019). I have considered a
version of the model with a more realistic pension that increases with human capital in a concave manner. Given the
nature and focus of this paper, this change has very little effects on the quantitative results in this paper.
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2.2 Firm’s problem and government
A representative firm produces output with constant returns to scale technology. The production
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas
Y = KαH1−α (18)
where K is aggregate capital stock, H denotes the aggregate labor input and α ∈ (0, 1). The
aggregate labor input H is then defined as





where ρ < 1 determines the elasticity of substitution (1/(1 − ρ)) between skilled workers H2 and
unskilled workers H1.
The representative firm in competitive markets solves the following profit maximization problem:
max {Y − w1H1 − w2H2 − (r + δ)K}
where δ is the capital depreciation rate. The first order conditions are
[K] : αKα−1H1−α = r + δ (20)










νρHρ−11 = w1 (21)










(1− ν)ρHρ−12 = w2 (22)
Government tax revenues from labor income and capital income are spent on four categories:
(i) social security pension payments Ω to retirees; (ii) lump-sum transfers T to all households, (iii)
public education for children {gj}
5
j=3; and (iv) government spending G that is not directly valued
by households. Government balances its budget each period.
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2.3 Equilibrium
Let xj ∈ Xj denote the age-specific state space defined according to the household’s recursive
problems in the previous subsection. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a collection
of factor prices w1, w2, r, the household’s decision rules, value functions Vj(xj), government policies
and age-specific measures πj over xj such that
1. Given the government policies and factor prices, household decision rules solve the house-
hold’s life cycle optimization problems defined in the previous subsection, and Vj(xj) are the
associated value functions;













hjnj(xj)dπj(·|κ = s), s = 1, 2;
4. Government budget balances: the sum of transfers payments, social security pension pay-
ments, public education spending and the residual government spending G(≥ 0) is equal to
the sum of labor income tax revenues and capital income tax revenues;
5. The vector of age-specific measures of households π = (π1, π2, ..., π11) is the fixed point of
π(X) = P (X,π) where P (X, ·) is a transition function determined by the household decision
rules and the exogenous probability distributions, and X is the generic subset of the Borel




I calibrate parameter values of the baseline model economy to match relevant US statistics. As is
standard, there are two sets of parameters. The first set of parameters is chosen externally without
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using model-generated data while the second set of parameters is determined internally. I now
describe them in detail.
3.1 Parameters calibrated externally
The two curvature parameters in the utility function, σ and χ, govern the household’s willingness
to substitute intertemporally. I set the value of σ equal to 1.5 so that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for consumption is 2/3 and the value of χ equal to 4/3, which implies the Frisch
elasticity of 0.75 (Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber 2013). As discussed in the previous section,
when a parent lives with a child, consumption in the utility function is replaced by c/q. The value
of q is set to 1.59 based on the OECD equivalence scale. Next, I set āc to be 25% of average income,
the size of which roughly corresponds to the exemption limit of gift tax in the US.9
The gross growth rates of human capital during adulthood {γj,κ}
8
j=1 for each education level κ
govern the life cycle profile of wages for high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Table A2 in Appendix
reports these 16 values computed based on the estimates in the PSID samples of Rupert and
Zanella (2015). The key features captured by these estimates are that (i) the growth rates are
much higher in the early adult periods and then diminish as they become older; and that (ii)
college-educated households face significantly higher growth rates than those without a college
degree. The parameter γc that maps childhood human capital to adulthood human capital is set
to 20.98 so that the output in the baseline model is normalized to be 1.
I now move on to the parameters related to government. As noted earlier, labor income taxation
is progressive, and the degree of progressivity differs by the household structure. Table A3 in
Appendix reports how these values are chosen for each j. A key feature to note is that progressivity
is higher for households with a child. The tax rate for capital income τk is set to 0.36. Both labor
and capital taxation parameters are based on the estimates in Holter et al. (2019). To obtain the
size of public education investments, I follow the approach by Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and
Holter (2015) in that education spending by state and federal government are treated as public
investments whereas education spending by local government is treated as private investments.
This is motivated by the fact that early education in the US is largely locally-financed. Using the
9 I have considered the models with alternative values for āc around this value. The main quantitative results
herein are not very sensitive to the value of āc after the model is recalibrated to match the target statistics.
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information in 2016 from the Education at Glance published by the OECD, I obtain the public
investments in periods 3-5 relative to mean income to be 0.060, 0.098 and 0.111, respectively.10 It
is important to note that public education spending increases with child’s education stage. Next,
following Lee and Seshadri (2019), the size of government transfers T is set to 2% of output to
capture welfare programs. Finally, the value of Ω is set to imply that the social security replacement
rate is 40%.
As for the production sector, the capital share in the aggregate US data leads to the choice
of αK = 0.36. The five-year capital depreciation rate δ is computed under 2.5% of the quarterly
depreciation rate. These parameter values are within the range commonly used in the quantitative
macroeconomics literature (e.g., Krusell and Smith 1998). Finally, I set ρ = 1/3 so that the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled is 1.5 (Ciccone and Peri 2005).11
3.2 Parameters calibrated internally
The rest of the parameters are calibrated internally. Table 2 summarizes a set of parameters that
are jointly calibrated by simulating the model economy. These parameter values are determined
as minimizers of the distance between the relevant statistics from the data and those from the
model-generated data. Despite a relatively large number of parameters and targets, there are clear
relationships between them, and the model matches the target statistics quite well. I now explain
the role of these parameters in the model, and illustrate how each parameter is related to its target
statistic, as summarized in Table 2. All statistics regarding time-use are obtained from the 2003-
2017 waves of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), combined with the Current Population
Survey (CPS). More details on the data can be found in Appendix.
Preference First, β is households’ discount factor. The relevant target for this parameter is set
to be the annual interest rate of 4%, as is standard in the literature. The equilibrium capital-output
ratio is 2.92 at the annual frequency, which is in line with US data. The next parameter b determines
the disutility constant for hours worked. The relevant target for b is set to be the average weekly
10The details are available in Appendix. These values are in line with the estimates in Lee and Seshadri (2019).
11As this elasticity is important for policy exercises that strongly influence college decisions, in Appendix, I also
present the policy exercise results based on ρ = 2/3, or the elasticity of 3, which is close to the value used in Abbott
et al. (2019).
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Table 2: Internally calibrated parameters and target statistics
Parameter Target statistics Data Model
Preference
β .971 Equilibrium real interest rate (annual) 0.04 0.04
b 23.4 Average hours of work (age 30-64) .287 .287
η .315 Average inter-vivos transfers/GDP per-capita .056 .057
Childhood human capital production
θx
3
.919 Average parental time investments in period 3 .061 .061
θx
4
.219 Average parental time investments in period 4 .036 .036
θx
5
.043 Average parental time investments in period 5 .020 .020
θI
3
.401 Average parental monetary investments in period 3 .098 .096
θI
4
.262 Average parental monetary investments in period 4 .113 .110
θI
5
.185 Average parental monetary investments in period 5 .128 .126
ζ3 −3.96 Educational gradients in parental time in period 3 (%) 20.9 20.5
ζ4 −1.33 Educational gradients in parental time in period 4 (%) 14.8 15.0
ζ5 −1.65 Educational gradients in parental time in period 5 (%) 20.2 20.3
College
ν .534 Fraction with a college degree (%) 34.2 34.0
ι .106 Degree of positive selection .50 .479
µξ .389 Average college expenses/GDP per-capita .140 .142
δξ .595 Observed college wage gap (%) 75.0 81.2
Remaining parameters
ρφ .097 Intergenerational correlation of percentile-rank income .341 .346
σφ .597 Gini wage .370 .373
σz .144 Slope of variance of log wage from age 25-29 to age 55-59 .180 .184
18
hours of work for those whose age is between 30 and 65. This leads to 30.16/105 = 0.287, provided
that the weekly feasible time endowment is 105(= 15×7) hours, excluding time for sleeping and basic
personal care. Similarly, the disutility parameter ϕ affects the average parental time investments
in all periods. Given the calibration strategy using θxj to control average parental time investments
in period j as described below, ϕ is calibrated together with b such that the marginal disutility
of parental time is given by the marginal disutility of work evaluated at the mean hours worked
(ϕ = bn̄χ). Finally, η is calibrated to match the average inter-vivos transfers. Recall that the role
of the inter-vivos transfers in the model is to provide young households with financial resources
that help complete college education. The relevant target is thus the total parental transfers made
for children during the college years. More precisely, I sum up the money from parents and college
transfers from age 18 to age 26, reported in Table 4 of Johnson (2013), while accounting for the
fraction of recipients. This leads to the ratio of average parental financial transfers to the five-year
GDP per-capita, which is 0.056.
Childhood human capital production There are three parameters − θxj , θ
I
j and ζj − in the
per-period production (12), (13) and (14). To calibrate these parameters, I use the clear linkages
between each parameter and its corresponding target moment in the model economy. First, θxj
determines the relative importance of time investments (as compared to monetary investments),
and it clearly increases the average parental time investment in period j. Therefore, for each j,
the target moment for θxj is set to be the mean parental time investments in period j. To compute
statistics regarding parental time investment, I focus on parental time spent directly with children
that can promote development of children’s human capital (see Appendix for details). A notable
feature of these moments is that it is highest in early years (0.061 in the model or 6.4 hours per
week) and decreases with children’s age.
Next, given the values of θxj and gj , a higher θ
I
j strongly increases parental monetary investments
in period j. Therefore, I set the mean private education spending in period j as a target moment
for θIj . As discussed above, average private education spending in the data is constructed as the
sum of not only private spending but also local government spending as in Restuccia and Urrutia
(2004) and Holter (2015) because public schools are largely funded through local taxes in the US.
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This leads to the target statistics of 0.098, 0.113 and 0.128 for j = 3, 4 and 5, respectively (see
Appendix for details). Unlike the parental time inputs, note that money inputs increase with
children’s education stage.
Finally, ζj governs the elasticity of substitution between time and money in period j. In US
data, more educated parents spend more time with children (Guryan et al. 2008; Ramey and
Ramey 2010). I use this elasticity of substitution to replicate this salient fact.12 The empirical
moments are obtained from the ATUS data. Educational gradients, estimated while controlling for
some observable characteristics of parents, are around 20%, meaning that college-educated parents
spend 20 percent more time than parents without a college degree.13 In order to match the stage-
specific educational gradients, the baseline specification that allows ζj to differ by j. Note that the
calibration leads to the elasticity of substitution to be lower in j = 3 (0.20) than later periods (0.43
and 0.38 in j = 4 and 5, respectively). In other words, parental time and financial investments are
more complementary to each other when children are very young.14
College The parameter ν in the aggregate production function (19) is calibrated to match the
fraction with a college degree (34.2%), as in Lee and Seshadri (2019). In the US, people with higher
pre-college human capital are more likely to have a college degree. Specifically, the probability of
becoming a four-year college graduate for the top pre-college human capital quintile is about 50
percentage-point higher than that for the bottom quintile, according to Heckman, Stixrud and
Urzua (2006). Recall that the value of ι in the cost of college (5) governs the relative strength of
need-based scholarships in determining college costs. As ι increases, more asset poor households
would be able to go to college (holding other things constant), thereby reducing the degree of
positive selection. Therefore, I choose this as a target statistic to discipline the degree of positive
selection into college in the model.
The target statistic for µξ in the model is set to be the equilibrium ratio of average (tuition
12Zhu and Vural (2013) show how the complementarity between time and money in human capital production affects
the wage gradient of parental time in an analytically tractable model with two-period-lived overlapping generations
and a single parental investment period.
13Precisely, the education gradient refers to the percentage difference in mean parental time investments between
education groups. See Appendix for details.
14 In Appendix, I consider an alternative calibration strategy where ζj = ζ for all j. When the model is calibrated
in this way by matching the overall education gradient (without targeting age-specific gradients), the model implies
that educational gradients in parental time investment would increase with children’s age.
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and non-tuition) expenses after financial aid to per capita GDP. Specifically, I first compute the
average ratio of annual college tuition and required fees (excluding room and board) for four-year
institutions to the per capita real GDP for the recent periods 1990-2011, which is 0.22 according
to the Digest of Education Statistics (2011, Table 349) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In
order to approximate actual costs faced by students, I also include the non-tuition expenses such
as books, other supplies, commuting costs, and room and board expenses that would not have to
be paid by a person who chooses not to go to college, as in Abbott et al. (2019). These non-tuition
expenses amount to approximately 30% of the average tuition and fees. In 2000-2001, the average
grants (federal, state/local, and institutional) received by full-time students in four-year colleges
weighted by numbers enrolled are approximately 50% of the average tuition and fees. Based on the
above information and assuming that college completion takes four years, the equilibrium ratio of
average financial college costs to the five-year GDP is 0.14. Finally, as the variability of college cost
draws σξ increases, the observed wage premium tends to decline. The observed college premium,
or the ratio between the average wage of those with a college degree and the average wage of those
without a college degree ranges from 70 to 80% in the ATUS samples depending on the age bands.
Thus, I choose 75% as a target, which is also in the range of recent estimates in Heathcote, Perri
and Violante (2010).
Remaining parameters A higher ρφ leads to a higher degree of economic associations across
generations. I set its relevant target as the rank correlation of family income of 0.341 (Chetty et
al. 2014a), which has been relatively stable in the US (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner
2014b). Due to the data limitation, Chetty et al. (2014a) estimate intergenerational persistence
using the proxy income variable instead of lifetime income. The rank correlation from the model,
which is used as a target statistic, is also obtained based on the proxy incomes equivalently defined
as in Chetty et al. (2014a) (see Section 5 for the precise definition of proxy income).
Recall that the idiosyncratic shocks to adult human capital z, following a normal distribution,
have mean zero with the standard deviation of σz. Since both σφ and σz are exogenous sources
of the cross-sectional dispersion of wages in the model, I choose the Gini coefficient of wage (0.37)
as a target statistic. Note that, although the degree of wage inequality monotonically increases
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with either σφ or σz, their economic mechanism is very different. This is because σφ affects the
variability of the initial condition in human capital while σz affects households over the working
life. Specifically, holding the overall dispersion of wage constant, in the case when σz is relatively
larger, households would experience more volatile idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, the effect
of which accumulates over the life cycle. As a result, the life-cycle profile of wage inequality would
become steeper. Therefore, I choose the difference between the variance of log wage at age 55-59
and that of log wage at age 25-29 as an additional target to pin down the relative contribution of
each shock process to the overall wage inequality.15 These statistics on wage inequality in US data
for recent periods, obtained from Heathcote et al. (2010), are reported in Table 2.
4 Assessing the model as a quantitative theory of intergenera-
tional mobility
Prior to the quantitative exercises in the next sections such as counterfactual and policy exper-
iments, this section evaluates the baseline model economy as a quantitative theory of intergen-
erational mobility. I consider three measures of intergenerational mobility: (i) the IGE; (ii) the
rank correlation; and (iii) the quintile transition matrix. The intergenerational mobility estimates
reported below are based on family income in order to be consistent with US data counterparts
from Chetty et al. (2014a). Specifically, in Chetty et al. (2014a), family income is the five-year
per parent average of the pre-tax income defined as either the sum of Adjusted Gross Income, tax-
exempt interest income and the non-taxable portion of Social Security and Disability benefits (if a
tax return is filed) or the sum of wage earnings, unemployment benefits, and gross social security
and disability benefits (otherwise). In the model, family income is the five-year per parent sum of
labor earnings, interest income, and social security benefits. It is worth noting that family income is
more preferred to measure intergenerational mobility of the economic status when samples include
not only males but also females (Chadwick and Solon 2002), which is the case in Chetty et al.
(2014a) as well as in my gender-neutral model.
15With the help of this target, the model replicates the lifecycle inequality of wages and earnings over the age quite
well, as shown in Appendix (Figure A1).
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IGE and rank correlation The first measurement is the IGE, a conventional way to measure the
degree of intergenerational persistence in the literature. The IGE is the slope coefficient obtained
by running the following log-log regression equation:
logYchild = ρ0 + ρ1 logYparent + ε (23)
where Y is supposed to be permanent income. The IGE provides a straightforward interpretation:
a 1% increase in parental permanent income is associated with a ρ1% increase in their children’s
permanent income. Thus, a high ρ1 implies low intergenerational mobility. The second way to
measure intergenerational mobility is to use a rank-rank specification instead of a log-log specifica-
tion (Chetty et al. 2014a; 2014b). In other words, I estimate the slope parameter after replacing
log income with the percentile rank of income within one’s own generation in (23). The slope
coefficient in a rank-rank specification (or the rank correlation) has a similar interpretation: a
one percentage-point increase in parent’s percentile rank is associated with a ρ1 percentage-point
increase in their children’s percentile rank.16 Unlike the IGE, the rank correlation is less sensitive
to the treatment of zero income observations and is relatively robust to the point of measurement
in the income distribution (Chetty et al. 2014a; 2014b).
In the literature estimating intergenerational mobility, the biggest challenge is the data require-
ment: we need a data set that contains career-long income histories (or permanent income) for
at least two successive generations. Due to the data limitation, in practice, permanent income is
replaced with proxy income measured at a point in the life cycle. For purposes of comparison, I
present model statistics based on proxy income defined similarly to Chetty et al. (2014a). Specifi-
cally, in Chetty et al. (2014a), child’s income is measured when children are around 30 years old,
averaged over two years. The parent’s income is averaged over five years when parents are roughly
around 45 years old. Accordingly, in the model, the age at which the parent’s income is measured
is set to be 45-49 (j = 6), and the age at which the child’s income is measured is 30-34 (j = 3).
In addition, I also compute the intergenerational persistence measures using present-value lifetime
16Note that the rank-rank slope estimate is simply equal to the correlation coefficient in percentile rank (or Spear-
man correlation) since the independent and dependent variables, both of which are normalized by transforming the
income level to the percentile ranks, have the same variance.
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Table 3: Intergenerational persistence estimates
U.S. data Model
Chetty et al. Proxy income Lifetime income
(2014a) (discounted)
IGE: log-log slope 0.344 0.318 0.376
Rank corr: rank-rank slope 0.341 0.346 0.367
Notes: The log-log slope estimate is obtained from a univariate regression equation where the dependent variable
is the child’s log income and the independent variable is the parent’s log income. The rank-rank slope estimate is
obtained from an equivalent regression equation replacing log transformation with the percentile rank.
income discounted according to the equilibrium real interest rate (Haider and Solon 2006).
Table 3 reports these first two measures (i.e., slope estimates) from the model and the data.
The first column shows estimates from US data in Chetty et al. (2014a). Recall that the rank-rank
slope using proxy income has been used as a calibration target. The estimate of the log-log slope
(IGE) using lifetime income is 0.376, which is close to the estimates around 0.4 in Solon (1999).
Moreover, note that this estimate using lifetime income is considerably larger than the estimate
of 0.309 using proxy income. This is in line with findings in the empirical studies noting that the
short-term income (even multi-year averages) may not represent the permanent income, thereby
leading to the attenuation bias in estimating the persistence of income across generations. The
bias is smaller in the estimate of the rank-rank slope using proxy income instead of lifetime income
(0.346 versus 0.367).
Quintile transition matrix I now use the quintile transition matrix as a way of evaluating
how successful a candidate model is as a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility. The
income quintile transition matrix is a 5 by 5 matrix where the (a, b) element gives the conditional
probability that a child’s lifetime income is in the b-th quintile of his generation’s distribution,
provided that his parent’s income is in the a-th quintile of her own generation’s distribution. This
matrix provides a richer description of how economic status is transmitted across generations than
do the first two measures of correlations. Given that calibration targets do not include any elements
in the income quintile transition matrix and that the same correlation of income across generations
can be obtained from different disaggregated moments in the quintile transition matrix, comparison
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Table 4: Income quintile transition matrices: data vs. model
Unit: % U.S. data Model
Chetty et al. (2014a) Proxy income Lifetime income
Parent Child quintile Child quintile Child quintile
quint. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 33.7 28.0 18.4 12.3 7.5 35.0 25.5 18.1 14.4 7.0 36.2 26.3 16.2 14.6 6.8
2nd 24.2 24.2 21.7 17.6 12.3 25.7 22.0 21.8 17.7 12.7 25.8 22.6 21.7 18.0 11.9
3rd 17.8 19.8 22.1 22.0 18.3 18.3 19.3 22.1 21.3 18.9 18.9 18.5 23.7 20.3 18.6
4th 13.4 16.0 20.9 24.4 25.4 13.7 18.1 20.5 22.0 25.7 12.6 17.6 21.2 22.3 26.3
5th 10.9 11.9 17.0 23.6 36.5 7.3 15.1 17.5 24.6 35.7 6.5 15.0 17.3 24.8 36.5
of the model output to the empirical quintile transition matrix would be a straightforward way of
evaluating a model as a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility.17
Table 4 compares the transition matrix obtained from US data (Chetty et al. 2014a) to the
transition matrices using the model-generated data. Three features are worth noting in the tran-
sition matrix from US data. First, it shows that the observed positive correlations of income
across generations are not simply due to the intergenerational poverty trap but are also due to the
rich families that sustain their economic status intergenerationally. Specifically, the probability of
children remaining in the bottom quintile when their parents’ income lies in the bottom quintile is
33.7%, and the probability of children staying in the top quintile when their parents’ income belong
to the top quintile is even higher: 36.5%. Second, there is quite a bit of mobility in the middle of the
income distribution. For instance, children born into the third quintile parents are almost equally
likely to be located in any income quintiles (18− 22%). Third, both upward mobility, measured by
a probability of moving up from the bottom quintile to the top quintile, and downward mobility,
measured by a probability of moving down from the top quintile to the bottom quintile, are quite
low (7.5% and 10.9%, respectively).
The middle panel of Table 4 shows that the model is able to account for the above salient
features in the US income quintile transition matrix strikingly well despite the fact the calibration
only targets the overall correlation of income across generations. In particular, the model generates
a high probability of staying in the bottom quintile (35.0%) and the even higher probability of
17Note that this is in the same spirit as the model validation exercises in the quantitative macroeconomics literature
on income and wealth inequality. For instance, the same high Gini coefficient can be due to a various combination of
sizeable poor households and super rich households.
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staying in the top quintile (35.7%). The model also predicts a substantial degree of mobility in the
middle of the income distribution: children born into the third quintile parents are almost equally
likely to end up with any quintiles (18 − 22%). Finally, the upward mobility rate is 7.0% in the
model, which is very close to the data counterpart (7.5%).
The right panel of Table 4 reports the quintile transition matrix when lifetime income is used. As
shown in Table 3, intergenerational mobility is slightly lower when lifetime income is used. This is
evident from higher probabilities of remaining in the bottom (36.2%) and in the top (36.5%) income
quintiles. The upward mobility rate is also slightly lower at 6.8% in terms of lifetime income. In
order to quantify the effects of various channels and policy changes on intergenerational mobility
more accurately,.the following sections will focus on the intergenerational mobility measures using
lifetime income instead of proxy income, the latter of which is subject to attenuation biases (Haider
and Solon 2006).
5 Sources of intergenerational lifetime income mobility
In this section, I assess the quantitative importance of various channels in shaping the intergen-
erational mobility of lifetime income and inspect mechanisms through which each channel affects
mobility. I first focus on the role of the parental time investment — the key channel of interest in
this paper. Then, I examine other channels that shape intergenerational mobility in the model.
It is important to note that the quantitative significance of various channels studied herein reveal
the total equilibrium effects of shutting down one channel in the presence of other channels that
could be either reinforcing or dampening. In addition, note that the counterfactual exercises in this
section are not meant to be realistic; instead, the goal is to clearly demonstrate the role of each
channel through marked restrictions in the model.
5.1 Parental time investment channel
In the first set of counterfactual exercises, I explore the role of the parental time investment channel —
the focus of this paper. In the baseline model, households choose to invest different amounts of time
and money endogenously. To quantify the importance of heterogeneity in parental time investments
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across households, I shut down educational gradients in parental time investments by imposing that
all parents invest the same amount of time at its average from the baseline specification. Note that
this exercise is feasible given the nature of the time endowment being equal across households.18
Table 5 reports the results. Because parental investments are made in multiple periods, I
consider 7 different combinations of removing educational gradients in parental time investments. I
first impose xj = x̄j for each period j individually. The results show that intergenerational mobility
measures change quite significantly. Both IGE and the rank correlation fall by 0.05 (or 13-14%)
in periods j = 3, 5 and by 0.03-0.04 (or 10%) in period j = 4. The upward mobility rate goes
up by 0.9-1.2 percentage points (or 14-18%). It should be noted that these are equilibrium effects
where parents can endogenously respond using the other existing channels that can strengthen
intergenerational association. In fact, Table 5 shows that educational gradients in parental time in
the other periods when parents are not constrained by the restriction xj = x̄j become higher and
that parental financial transfers increase. Despite these counter-efforts, intergenerational mobility
becomes higher, thereby suggesting the quantitative importance of heterogeneity in parental time
investments in shaping intergenerational mobility.
Table 5 also reports when I impose xj = x̄j for two periods simultaneously. The results show
that the overall effects of shutting down heterogeneity in parental time in two periods are slightly
larger than the sum of the individual effects when it is done separately. This is natural given
dynamic complementarity in the production technology (10). The last row of Table 5 shows that
removing heterogeneity in parental time investments in all the childhood periods would reduce
both IGE and the rank correlation by 0.142 (or 38-39%) and increase the upward mobility rate
by 4 percentage points, highlighting the strong quantitative role of the parental time investment
channel.
To better understand the mechanism through which the parental time investment channel af-
fects intergenerational income mobility, it is useful to look at the equilibrium relationship between
parental time and monetary investments. The upper three figures of Figure 1 show their relation-
ship in the baseline model economy for each period j = 3, 4, 5. The bottom three figures show their
counterparts in the counterfactual exercise where x3 = x̄3 is imposed.
18 In contrast, it is generally not feasible to consider a counterfactual exercise that imposes the same amount of
private money investments due to the evident income inequality both in the model and in the data.
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Table 5: Quantitative effects of heterogeneity in parental time investments on intergenerational
mobility
IGE Rank Upward Educ. gradient Mean
corr mobility in xj (%) P/Y
(%) j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
Baseline .376 .367 6.8 20.5 15.0 20.3 .057
Counterfactuals
(1) Single period
- x3 = x̄3 .327 .317 7.9 0.0 15.3 20.5 .059
- x4 = x̄4 .340 .330 7.7 21.1 0.0 20.6 .060
- x5 = x̄5 .327 .317 8.0 20.9 15.5 0.0 .061
(2) Two periods
- x3 = x̄3 & x4 = x̄4 .289 .280 9.0 0.0 0.0 21.3 .062
- x4 = x̄4 & x5 = x̄5 .288 .279 9.1 21.6 0.0 0.0 .064
- x3 = x̄3 & x5 = x̄5 .275 .265 9.3 0.0 16.0 0.0 .063
(3) All periods
- xj = x̄j for j = 3, 4, 5 .234 .225 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 .067
In the upper figures, one can easily notice a clear positive association between time (x-axis)
and money (y-axis) due to strong complementarities between these two inputs in each period.
Note that this also means that rich parents are investing much more money than poor parents
because they are investing more (complementary) time inputs. On the other hand, when parents
are constrained to invest the fixed mean time x̄3 in the bottom-left figure, we can see that the
variation of monetary investments decrease significantly, especially driven by disappearance of high
investments. This explains why intergenerational mobility increases, even with higher educational
gradients in parental time in other periods j = 4, 5 and greater amounts of parental transfers, as
shown in Table 5.
5.2 Other channels shaping intergenerational mobility
I now move on to other channels that shape the intergenerational mobility of lifetime income in
the model. In the model economy, parents can transfer money to their child when she becomes
independent. An important role of this money is to provide financial help for their child’s college
decision. In Table 6, the first counterfactual exercise reported is to shut down the inter-vivos transfer
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Figure 1: Time and money investments in simulated data
Notes: The upper panels are obtained from the baseline model whereas the bottom panels are obtained from a
counterfactual exercise where x3 = x̄3 for all households. Each dot represents the choices of a simulated sample for
monetary investments (y-axis) and time investments (x-axis).
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channel by setting ac = 0. It is striking to note that intergenerational persistence estimates, both
IGE and rank correlation, become slightly higher (or mobility goes down) in this counterfactual
exercise. In fact, Table 6 shows that richer parents, who are not allowed to transfer money to
their children, choose to invest more time in young children instead. This substitution towards
parental time investment leads to greater educational gradients in parental time, which in turn
raises intergenerational income persistence and reduce upward mobility.
Public education investments {gj}
5
j=3 in the model are provided to everyone equally. Therefore,
their presence is expected to dampen intergenerational association in the model. To explore the
equilibrium effects of the public education investment channel, the next three rows of Table 6
report the results from setting gj = 0 for j = 3, 4, 5. As expected, we can see that intergenerational
mobility measures indicate lower mobility in the absence of public investments. In particular, the
effects are stronger for the periods j = 4, 5 where the size of public investments are greater in the
baseline economy. For instance, IGE would increase by 0.02 (or 5-6%) when public investments are
eliminated in either j = 4 or j = 5.
The next row shows the result when the exogenous source of intergenerational persistence is shut
down by setting ρφ = 0. Note that the calibrated persistence of φ may capture genetic transmission
that would tend to increase φ but also any other factors that are not modeled herein that could in
principle also reduce the calibrated φ. Given that the calibrated ρφ was positive, we can see that
shutting down ability transmission reduces both IGE and the rank correlation quite considerably
by 20%. In particular, the upward mobility rate goes up by 2.2 percentage points (or 34%). These
results show that the external transmission of ability is a quantitatively important source of lifetime
income persistence in the model.
Lastly, I also examine the role of idiosyncratic shocks over the life cycle by setting σz = 0.
Note that the most immediate consequence of this restriction is to limit intragenerational mobility
because idiosyncratic shocks essentially play a role of moving up and down the ranking of adults’
wage over the life cycle. When this is shut down, initial conditions at the beginning of adulthood
becomes much more important in determining lifetime income, because the initial gap would be
simply amplified through steeper wage growth rates among the college-educated. This implies that
parental influence on child’s lifetime income becomes greater, and as a result, intergenerational
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Table 6: Quantitative effects of other mechanisms on intergenerational mobility
IGE Rank Upward Educ. gradient Mean
corr mobility in xj (%) Tp/Y
(%) j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
Baseline .376 .367 6.8 20.5 15.0 20.3 .057
Counterfactuals
- No inter-vivos transfers .394 .385 6.6 21.5 15.9 21.1 .000
- g3 = 0 .381 .371 6.6 20.4 14.5 19.7 .058
- g4 = 0 .396 .383 6.0 20.1 17.5 19.7 .058
- g5 = 0 .397 .384 5.9 20.2 14.6 23.5 .057
- No persistence in φ .300 .291 9.0 20.1 14.8 19.7 .059
- No idiosyncratic shocks .395 .377 4.8 20.7 15.7 20.8 .054
mobility decreases quite significantly without adulthood idiosyncratic shocks to human capital.
6 Policy experiments
In this section, the baseline model economy is used to consider various policies that can be con-
sidered as tools to influence intergenerational mobility. I consider universal (or flat) policies that
can avoid stigmatization especially when it comes to family policies (Heckman 2008). The main
objective of this section is to examine and illustrate desirable properties of effective policies to
increase intergenerational mobility. In doing so, I also examine the implications of such policies
for aggregate output and welfare.19 That way, we could better evaluate whether policy changes
that raise intergenerational mobility are otherwise desirable for the economy. All the policies are
designed to be financed through G to satisfy the government budget constraint without changing
taxes. For illustrative convenience, all monetary values are expressed in (approximately) 2011 US
dollar under the assumption that the annual GDP per capita in the baseline model is $50,000, a
value close to nominal GDP per capita in 2011.
19Welfare changes are measured by a consumption equivalent premium, as is standard in the literature. Specifically,
I measure the percentage change in consumption for all agents in the baseline model that makes them indifferent to
living in the alternative economy using the utilitarian social welfare function.
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6.1 Subsidizing college education
College is often believed to be a means of upward mobility. I first consider subsidizing college
costs as a way of providing easier access to college. Specifically, the college cost (5) in the budget
constraint (6) is replaced by
(1− sc)ψ(ξ, a) (24)
where sc ∈ [0, 1] is a subsidy rate. I consider the two levels of the rate: 10% and 20%. For each level
of sc, I also report the results obtained while holding prices (w1, w2 and r) fixed at the baseline
level, denoted as FP (fixed prices).
Some interesting results emerge in Table 7. Clearly, the college fraction increases sharply
when sc increases in the case of FP. For instance, with respect to 20% subsidy, college graduates
increase by 8.8 percentage points. However, intergenerational mobility measures are barely affected
despite substantial increases in college graduates. Note that the FP results are not equilibrium
outcomes because prices are held fixed and are not market-clearing. When prices are allowed to
adjust in general equilibrium, we can see that the increases of the college fraction are dramatically
dampened.20 Again, we can see that all intergenerational mobility measures change only marginally.
To better understand this insignificance of college subsidies on intergenerational mobility, it is
useful to understand how the college choice is made. In the model, college decisions depend not
only on financial conditions but also on pre-college human capital. The discrete decision rule for
college education features threshold-based behavior. More precisely, holding other things constant,
the college decision rule is to get a college degree if his or her human capital is above some threshold
level. The reason is that the return to college, which is accumulated over the life cycle through
higher growth rates, increases with their pre-college human capital level. This property of the
college decision rule leads to positive selection in equilibrium, meaning that those who have higher
pre-college human capital is more likely to be college-educated. Note that this relationship is not
perfect because college costs are stochastic and depends negatively on assets.
To visualize the quantitative importance of pre-college human capital that exists in the model,
20This general equilibrium effect hinges on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers,
shaped by the parameter ρ. In Appendix, I consider an alternative calibration where I double ρ. The same policy
exercises show that the college fraction increases more in general equilibrium, but is still much weaker than the case
with fixed prices.
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Table 7: Effects of providing easier access to college
Baseline sc = 0.1 sc = 0.2
FP GE FP GE
IGE .376 .376 .375 .376 .375
Rank correlation .367 .367 .366 .367 .366
Upward mobility (%) 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.8
College fraction (%) 34.0 38.1 34.3 42.8 34.5
Observed college premium (%) 81.2 81.6 79.3 83.1 77.7
Educ. gradient in xj (%)
- j = 3 20.5 20.8 20.1 21.2 19.8
- j = 4 15.0 15.0 14.6 15.1 14.4
- j = 5 20.3 20.3 19.8 20.5 19.3
Aggregate output (% chg) - - 0.0 - -0.1
Aggregate capital (% chg) - - -0.1 - -0.1
Consumption equiv.(%) - +0.2 +0.1 +0.5 +0.3
Notes: FP (fixed prices) refers to the case where prices are held constant at the baseline level. Output changes
are not reported in these cases. Average labor productivity is defined as aggregate output per total hours worked.
Welfare gains are the consumption equivalent premium measured by a percentage change in consumption required
for all agents to be indifferent to living in an alternative economy.
Figure 2: Probabilities of being college graduates at age 30 relative to unconditional mean
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Figure 2 plots the probability of being a college graduate at age 30 by the quintiles of pre-college
human capital. The data counterparts are from Heckman et al. (2006) by either cognitive factors or
non-cognitive factors.21 It clearly shows that high pre-college human capital raises the probability
of becoming a college graduate, indicating positive selection into college both in the model and in
the data. Note that the model produces a slope, which captures the strength of selection, in line
with the data, as the calibration strategy roughly targets this overall slope.
By now it should be clearer why college subsidies turned out to be ineffective in affecting inter-
generational mobility. Given the property of the college decision rule featuring positive selection as
shown above, the marginal households affected by the subsidy tend to have lower pre-college human
capital than those who would go to college already. On average, those marginal college graduates
do accumulate more of human capital but only up to the level less than those who already choose to
go to college, leading to little rank reversals. Therefore, such college subsidies that could potentially
induce more people to go to college are difficult to affect intergenerational mobility.
6.2 Subsidizing childhood education
The counterfactual analysis in Section 5 has shown that the parental time investment channel is
quantitatively important in shaping intergenerational mobility, calling for policy interventions that
affect parental time investment behavior. However, in practice, it is very difficult for government to
directly influence parental time investments because time spent with children is mostly home-based
and is not observable to government. Therefore, in this subsection, I consider two kinds of policies
on monetary investments in children instead, noting that they can indirectly influence parental
time investment behavior.
The first is a subsidy se,j proportional to private education spending e. In other words, the
left-hand side of the resource constraint in period j is replaced by
c+ a′ + (1− se,j)e. (25)
I consider providing this subsidy for each period j = 3, 4, 5 separately. The subsidy rate is chosen as
21The samples considered in Heckman et al. (2006) have a lower unconditional mean probability. To focus on the
slope rather than the level, Figure 2 plots probabilities relative to the unconditional mean probability.
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Table 8: Effects of increasing quantity of parental time investment
Baseline se,j = 0.2 ∆gj = 0.02/Y
j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
IGE .376 .367 .378 .380 .366 .363 .365
Rank correlation .367 .358 .368 .370 .359 .355 .357
Upward mobility (%) 6.8 7.0 6.5 6.5 7.2 7.4 7.2
Mean (% chg)
- ē3 (relative to Y ) .096 +22.1 -2.3 -2.2 -20.3 -0.6 -0.4
- ē4 .110 -1.6 +35.4 -1.5 -0.4 -15.6 -0.2
- ē5 .126 -1.4 -1.3 +37.4 -0.6 -0.5 -13.4
- x̄3 (hrs/wk) 6.4 +11.4 +0.6 +0.5 +0.5 -0.1 -0.1
- x̄4 3.8 +0.6 +9.0 +0.5 -0.3 +2.3 -0.1
- x̄5 2.1 +0.9 +0.8 +11.3 -0.4 -0.2 +2.2
Educ. gradient in xj (%)
- j = 3 20.5 18.2 20.0 20.0 19.3 20.6 20.6
- j = 4 15.0 14.5 15.6 14.6 15.0 11.9 15.0
- j = 5 20.3 19.6 19.7 21.2 20.1 20.2 17.2
Aggregate output (% chg) - +3.1 +2.6 +2.3 +0.2 +0.5 +0.4
Aggregate capital (% chg) - +2.8 +2.3 +2.0 +0.3 +0.4 +0.2
Consumption equiv.(%) - +3.3 +2.5 +2.1 +0.7 +0.9 +0.7
20% for each case. As this policy is expected to encourage parental monetary investments, it could,
in principle, boost parental time investments that are complementary inputs in the skill formation
technology.
The second policy tool I consider is to increase public investments gj directly. The idea is similar
to the previous one: by increasing (public) monetary investments, parents are indirectly incentivized
to invest more time that is a complementary input to human capital production. However, the key
difference to note is that an increase in gj would affect not only time investment choices but also
private education spending. The magnitude of changes is set to 2% of mean income in each period.
Table 8 summarizes the results for each policy exercise conducted in different target periods.
I first focus on the effects of subsidies to private education spending. As expected, we can see
that this subsidy se,j increases not only monetary investments (22-37%) but also time investments
substantially (around 10%) in the period j targeted by each policy. However, it is interesting to
note that intergenerational mobility increases in the case of subsidy in period 3 whereas it goes
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down in the other cases (se,4 = 0.2 and se,5 = 0.2). Why does the higher average time investment
have such opposite effects on intergenerational mobility? To better understand this, Figure 3 plots
the percentage change in parental time investments by income quintile for the private education
subsidies in three target periods. Note that, although the effect of each subsidy (i.e., se,j) on
the unconditional mean of parental time investment in its corresponding period j is very similar
(around 10%), their impact across the distribution differs sharply. More specifically, increases in
parental time investments in lower income quintiles are much more pronounced in the case of se,3
while parental time investments in the bottom quintile respond very weakly in the cases of se,4 and
se,5. As a result, educational gradients in parental time investments are reduced only in the case
of se,3 (from 20.5% to 18.2%), yet they become higher in the cases of se,4 (from 15.0% to 15.6%)
and se,5 (from 20.3% to 21.2%), explaining why intergenerational mobility changes in the opposite
direction.
A natural question is then why parental time investments among the bottom quintile respond
weakly with respect to subsidies to private education spending in later periods j = 4 and 5. The
key reason for this is that public investments are relatively larger in later periods (g4 = 0.098
and g5 = 0.111) compared to the early period (g3 = 0.060). Given the relatively large public
investments, Figure 4 that plots the distribution of private education expenditures across households
in each period j clearly shows that greater fractions of households are essentially constrained near
zero private spending, crowded out by public investments.22 For these households who are more
likely to be poor, the subsidy on private education is less effective, which in turn weakens their
parental time investment responses.23
Table 9 also reports the results when government directly increases public education spending.
As expected, there are crowding-out effects. That is, private education spending strongly declines
in the period when public investments rise. Consequently, we can also see that parental time
investments rise only weakly (by less than 2%) in the targeted period, despite a sizeable increase
22The shares of households who spend near zero private education investment are prominent as a result of the
assumption that public and private education investments are perfect substitutes — a standard, yet relatively strong
assumption (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004; Holter, 2015). It should be viewed as illustrative to better understand
the theoretical mechanism.
23 In Appendix, Table A7 reports the results when se,5 is set to 0.2 while g5 is also set to be zero. In this case,
educational gradients in parental time in j = 5 also diminishes and intergenerational mobility increases. Thus, it
clearly corroborates the importance of the size of public investments when it comes to heterogeneous policy effects
of private education subsidies.
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Figure 3: Effects of subsidies to e in period j on parental time across income quintile
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Figure 4: Distributions of simulated private education spending in the baseline economy
in public education spending. One thing to note is that regardless of the choice of the period for
increasing public investments, education gradients in parental time investments tend to decline
(especially in the targeted period), leading to greater intergenerational mobility. This is precisely
related to the distribution of private investments, as shown in Figure 4. Because poor households
are generally near zero investments, crowding-out effects of public investments disproportionately
affect relatively richer households more, thereby reducing the gap in parental investments.
The overall lesson from the policy exercises above is that it is possible to increase intergen-
erational mobility through subsidizing parental investments during childhood. In particular, the
results highlight some pros and cons of (i) proportional subsidies to private investments and (ii) di-
rect expansions of government spending in education. The former tends to give rise to larger output
and welfare gains, yet it may rather decrease intergenerational mobility when public investments
are already sizeable (e.g., later childhood periods). The latter tends to induce greater mobility
regardless of timing of policy target periods but crowding-out effects generally lead to relatively
small output and welfare gains.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a quantitative model that encompasses various standard elements in the
quantitative macroeconomics literature such as general equilibrium and incomplete markets as well
as endogenous human capital development such as multiple-period childhood skill formation and
college. I have found that the model successfully accounts for positive educational gradients in
parental time investments as well as untargeted distributional aspects of intergenerational persis-
tence of income, as observed in US data. I have investigated the quantitative role of various mech-
anisms and found that nearly 40% of the intergenerational persistence of lifetime income is reduced
when educational gradients in parental time investments are eliminated, despite the alternative
endogenous channels that parents could rely on to strengthen the intergenerational association.
The policy experiments I examined in this paper illustrate that effective policies that are intended
to increase intergenerational mobility should focus on narrowing down the gap in parental time
investments. While doing so, the model also implies that there are better ways to achieve greater
mobility in terms of sides effects on aggregate output and welfare.
The purpose of the policy exercises in this paper was to provide some important characteristics
in designing actual policies to increase intergenerational mobility. An interesting avenue for future
work is to design a more effective and implementable policy scheme that keeps the universal nature.
For instance, a more ideal policy should specifically induce a greater amount of high-quality time
investment towards able children born into low human capital families, as what the social planner
who maximizes social welfare would do. In addition, it is important to note that this paper abstracts
from spillover effects. Consider an example of play-centers. If parents can (i) learn parenting skills
while watching how other parents spend time with their children in such centers or (ii) share
valuable information directly regarding parenting while spending time in such centers, they could
potentially increase their parenting quality at home as well. These spillovers effects could potentially
strengthen the effects of the aforementioned policies on intergenerational mobility.
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A Appendix
A.1 Time-use data
Statistics regarding time-use are computed using the 2003-2017 waves of the ATUS, combined with
the CPS. For all statistics reported, the ATUS statistical weights are used. To compute average
hours worked and the fraction holds a college degree, I consider both men and women and include
those whose age is greater than or equal to 30 and less than 65. A person is college-educated if the
highest level of completed school or highest degree received is Bachelor’s degree or above.
To construct the key variable of parental time investments, I focus on interactive activities that
require the existence of both a parent and a child in a common space. Such categories include
reading to/with children, playing with children, doing arts and crafts with children, playing sports
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Table A1: Education gradients in parental time investments
j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
College-educated 1.342 .561 .416
(.133) (.109) (.091)
Sex -2.62 -1.51 -1.20
(.123) (.101) (.083)
Age -.041 .016 .023
(.009) (.007) (.006)
Married -.911 -.318 -.102
(.085) (.064) (.053)
R2 .023 .014 .017
Average x 6.43 3.78 2.06
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The dependent variable is parental time x (weekly hours).
with children, talking with/listening to children, looking after children as a primary activity, caring
for and helping children, doing homework, doing home schooling, and other related educational
activities. For the time investment variable, I further restrict the sample to households who have
any child and whose age is between 21 and 55 (inclusive), as in Guryan et al. (2008). The statistics
by the model period is based on the age of youngest child: j = 3, 4, 5 correspond to age 0-4; age
5-9; age 10-14, respectively. Educational gradients in parental time investments are obtained by
regressing parental time on a college indicator variable while controlling for sex, age, and marital
status, as reported in Table A1. In fact, the coefficients on college are quite stable when control
variables are added, in line with Guryan et al. (2008).
The time-diary survey also reports secondary activities and part of them may also include
childcare. However, since the childcare time recorded as secondary activities is expected to be less
active and the same hours may not be effective as an input to skill formation (Del Boca et al.
2014), I do not consider the time of childcare recorded as secondary activities, and only focus on
childcare activities reported as a main activity.
A.2 More on parameter values calibrated externally
Table A2 reports the gross growth rates of human capital by age and education, computed based on
the estimates from the PSID samples in Rupert and Zanella (2015). Table A3 reports the estimates
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Table A2: Gross growth rates of human capital by age and education
j = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
γj,1 1.231 1.052 1.017 1.004 0.998 0.995 0.994 0.994
γj,2 1.317 1.152 1.101 1.063 1.032 1.004 0.975 0.942
Notes: The above values are computed based on the estimates from the PSID samples in Rupert and Zanella (2015).
Table A3: Parameter values for progressive taxation and public education investments
τj λj gj
j = 1, 2 .1106 .8177 j = 3 0.060
j = 3, ..., 6 .1585 .9408 j = 4 0.098
j = 7, 8, 9 .1080 .8740 j = 5 0.111
Notes: τj and λj are based on the estimates in Holter et al. (2019). Public education investments gj are based on
2019 Education at a Glance (OECD).
of two parameters shaping the progressive taxation by age, obtained from Holter et al. (2019). Note
that for j = 1, 2, estimates for single households are used, and for the later periods, estimates for
married households are used (either with a child for j = 3, ..., 6 or without children for j = 7, 8, 9).
To compute the public education and private education investments (money), I use the 2016
information published in 2019 Education at a Glance by the OECD. In terms of mapping from the
model period to education stages, I consider pre-primary as j = 3, primary as j = 4, and secondary
as j = 5 in the model. As explained in the main text, I follow the approach of Restuccia and Urrutia
(2004) and Holter (2015) by treating state and federal government spending as public investments
whereas local government spending is part of private investments. By using the local share of public
spending as 0.49, I obtain the adjusted shares of private and public investments for each period.
Then, private and public investments are obtained by multiplying the total education expenditure
per child (j = 3) or per student (j = 4, 5) at each education stage. Note that both mean private
investments and mean public investments are approximately in line with the estimates in Lee and
Seshadri (2019) based on the micro-level data with a relatively small number of samples.
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Figure A1: Lifecycle inequality in the model and the data
A.3 Life cycle inequality
Figure A1 shows the life cycle inequality for wages and earnings in the model and the data. The
data source is Heathcote et al. (2010). As in Heathcote et al. (2010), the unit of the y-axis is the
variance of log relative to the initial age. The figures show that the model replicates the quantitative
patterns of life cycle inequality that the dispersion of both wages and earnings increases with age.
A.4 Sensitivity analysis
First, I consider a calibration strategy where I match the overall educational gradient rather than
period-specific educational gradients in parental time investments. The overall fit of the model
is good except for educational gradients in parental time investment, which increase with age
monotonically, as can be seen in Table A4. The counterfactual exercises regarding the role of
parental time investment heterogeneity are roughly similar to the benchmark model in the main
text while it is also clear to see that shutting down heterogeneity in parental time investments in
period 3 has slightly weaker effects on intergenerational mobility in this case. This should not be
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Table A4: Alternative calibration 1: Quantitative effects on intergenerational mobility
IGE Rank Upward Educ. gradient Mean
corr mobility in xj (%) P/Y
(%) j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
Baseline .378 .369 6.7 17.2 21.5 24.7 .056
Counterfactuals
- x3 = x̄3 .338 .328 7.6 0.0 21.7 24.9 .058
- x4 = x̄4 .332 .322 7.8 17.7 0.0 25.1 .059
- x5 = x̄5 .319 .308 8.1 17.4 21.8 0.0 .059
- x3 = x̄3 & x4 = x̄4 .290 .280 8.8 0.0 0.0 25.6 .062
- x4 = x̄4 & x5 = x̄5 .270 .260 9.4 18.1 0.0 0.0 .063
- x3 = x̄3 & x5 = x̄5 .275 .265 9.3 0.0 22.6 0.0 .062
- xj = x̄j for j = 3, 4, 5 .224 .216 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 .066
- No inter-vivos transfers .395 .385 6.4 18.1 22.3 25.4 .000
- g3 = 0 .383 .372 6.5 17.0 20.7 23.8 .057
- g4 = 0 .395 .382 6.0 16.5 23.0 23.7 .057
- g5 = 0 .398 .385 5.9 16.6 20.8 27.3 .055
- No persistence in φ .315 .306 8.6 17.0 21.1 24.1 .058
- No idiosyncratic shocks .395 .377 5.0 17.2 22.0 25.1 .053
Notes: The above results are based on the alternative calibration that imposes ζj = ζ for j = 3, 4, 5.
surprising since the baseline model in this alternative calibration generates a lower educational gra-
dient in parental time in the first place (17.2%). The overall effect of heterogeneity in parental time
investments (the final row) gives a similar quantitative effect that both IGE and rank correlation
of lifetime income would decrease nearly by 40%.
I also consider an alternative calibration in that the persistence of ability is imposed to be higher
at ρφ = 0.15. Then, I recalibrate the model with the same set of target statistics excluding only
the intergenerational correlation of income (which is the main target of the parameter ρφ in the
main text). Table A5 summarizes the quantitative role of various mechanisms in this alternative
calibration. Note that the baseline model in this alternative calibration features lower intergen-
erational mobility as I do not allow ρφ to be calibrated to match the observed rank correlation.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the quantitative role of various channels is very similar
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Table A5: Alternative calibration 2: Quantitative effects on intergenerational mobility
IGE Rank Upward Educ. gradient Mean
corr mobility in xj (%) P/Y
(%) j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
Baseline .418 .409 5.6 20.6 14.8 20.2 .056
Counterfactuals
- x3 = x̄3 .371 .361 6.7 0.0 15.3 20.7 .059
- x4 = x̄4 .384 .374 6.5 21.1 0.0 20.6 .060
- x5 = x̄5 .371 .360 6.8 20.8 15.3 0.0 .060
- x3 = x̄3 & x4 = x̄4 .334 .324 7.7 0.0 0.0 21.4 .062
- x4 = x̄4 & x5 = x̄5 .333 .323 7.9 21.6 0.0 0.0 .063
- x3 = x̄3 & x5 = x̄5 .320 .309 8.1 0.0 15.9 0.0 .062
- xj = x̄j for j = 3, 4, 5 .279 .270 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 .066
- No inter-vivos transfers .436 .426 5.5 21.5 15.7 21.0 .000
- g3 = 0 .423 .413 5.5 20.5 14.5 19.9 .058
- g4 = 0 .436 .423 5.0 20.2 17.2 19.7 .057
- g5 = 0 .438 .425 5.0 20.3 14.6 23.4 .056
- No persistence in φ .305 .295 8.8 20.2 15.0 19.9 .060
- No idiosyncratic shocks .440 .424 4.0 20.9 15.7 21.1 .053
Notes: The above results are based on the alternative calibration that imposes ρφ = 0.15.
to the baseline calibration in the main text. As the change in mobility measures are similar in
magnitude, percentage changes in correlations relative to the baseline are smaller but percentage
changes in upward mobility becomes larger. This is because the baseline model in this alternative
calibration features higher IGE and rank correlation yet lower upward mobility in the first place.
Table A6 shows the policy exercises on subsidizing college with a different elasticity of substi-
tution between skilled and unskilled workers since policy effects may be sensitive to this elasticity.
Specifically, I set the value of ρ to 2/3 so that the elasticity becomes 3. This value is quite close
to 3.3 in Abbott et al. (2019). The results show that the general equilibrium results are much
stronger with the higher elasticity although the magnitudes are still much less than the fixed price
cases. More importantly, it is worth noting that the effects on intergenerational mobility are nearly
unaffected by this elasticity.
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Table A6: Alternative calibration 3: Effects of providing easier access to college
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline s = 0.1 s = 0.2
FP GE FP GE
IGE .376 .376 .376 .376 .375
Rank correlation .367 .367 .366 .367 .366
Upward mobility (%) 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.8
College fraction (%) 34.1 38.1 34.6 42.9 35.0
Observed college premium (%) 80.4 81.6 78.8 83.3 78.1
Educ. gradient in xj (%)
- j = 3 20.4 20.8 20.1 21.2 19.9
- j = 4 14.9 15.0 14.6 15.1 14.4
- j = 5 20.0 20.3 19.6 20.5 19.4
Aggregate output (% chg) - -0.0 - -0.1
Aggregate capital (% chg) - -0.1 - -0.1
Consumption equiv.(%) +0.2 +0.1 +0.5 +0.3
Notes: The above results are based on the alternative calibration where the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers are set to 3.
Table A7 reports the exercise that subsidizes private education spending in period 5 (se,5 = 0.2).
Here, the important difference (compared to the counterpart in the main text) is that the baseline
economy features zero public investment (g5 = 0). Unlike the result in the main text, we can see
that se,5 reduces educational gradients in parental time investments and increases mobility in this
case. This illustrates the importance of the size of public investments when determining the effects
of subsidies to private education spending on intergenerational mobility, as highlighted in the main
text.
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Table A7: Effects of private investment subsidy in the absence of public investment
g5 = 0 g5 = 0
se,5 = 0.2
IGE .397 .391
Rank correlation .384 .379
Upward mobility (%) 5.9 6.0
Mean (% chg)
- ē3 (relative to Y ) .097 .095
- ē4 .111 .109
- ē5 .235 .284
- x̄3 (hrs/wk) 6.5 6.6
- x̄4 3.8 3.9
- x̄5 2.1 2.3
Educ. gradient in xj (%)
- j = 3 20.2 19.7
- j = 4 14.6 14.3
- j = 5 23.5 22.5
Aggregate output (% chg) - +2.3
Aggregate capital (% chg) - +2.3
Consumption equiv.(%) - +2.8
50
